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THE DUE DILIGENCE REQUIREMENT FOR
PLAINTIFFS UNDER RULE 10b-5
Recent years have seen an extraordinary growth in the reach of
rule 10b-5. 1 Further expansion in the definition of a security to reach
a wide variety of transactions,2 abolition or relaxation of the purchas-
er-seller standing rule,a erosion of the scienter standard,4 and elimina-
tion of the privity requirements have all served to increase the likeli-
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS NOTE:
A. BiOMBERG, SECURrMs LAw: FRAUD-SEC RULE lOb-5 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as A. BRoimERo];
L. Loss, SEcuRrrms RrcuLAmioN (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as L. Loss].
1. Securities and Exchange Commission Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(1974), provides:
It shall .be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any fa-
cility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,
or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.
Rule lob-5 was promulgated pursuant to section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act,
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
2. See, e.g., Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967) (deposit in savings and
loan association); Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 452 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1971)
(promissory note); Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Central Nat'l Bank, 409 F.2d 989 (5th
Cir. 1969) (sale of a participation in a loan).
3. See, e.g., Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974) (Seventh Circuit rejects purchaser-seller rule);
Vincent v. Moench, 473 F.2d 430 (10th Cir. 1973) (plaintiff seeking injunction need
not show he was purchaser or seller of securities); 'Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872 (5th
Cir. 1970) (in derivative suit, standing rule is met where the corporation on whose be-
half suit is brought bought or sold securities); A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d
393 (2d Cir. 1967) (seller in aborted transaction has standing where defendant breached
agreement to buy the securities); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967) (shareholder in short form merger is "forced seller"
with standing to sue).
4. Compare Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 606 (5th Cir. 1974);
Cohen v. Franchard Corp., 478 F.2d 115, 122-23 (2d Cir. 1973) (scienter is necessary
element) with Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 734-35 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 951 (1968); Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374, 379-80 (10th Cir. 1965); Ellis v.
Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961) (defendant's negligence suffices); cf. SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854-55 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969) (negligence suffices in SEC enforcement proceeding).
5. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 101 (10th Cir.
1971); Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909, 913 (2d Cir. 1968); Texas Continental Life Ins.
Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242, 249 (6th Cir. 1962).
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hood of substantial recoveries by dissatisfied investors.0 As a result,
the number of, 10b-5 suits has skyrocketed.7 Increasingly, however,
the courts have begun to limit the reach of rule lOb-5 by setting stan-
dards of conduct for plaintiffs to meet.8 In a few cases suit has been
barred through application of in par! delicto principlesY A far 'more
common rationale is to deny recovery to plaintiffs who cannot satisfy
a judicially imposed "due diligence" burden. If the plaintiff alleges a
material misrepresentation or omission, the- due, diligence burden re-
quires him to search out some facts concerning -the advisability of a
purchase or sale of securities; he must also use common sense in inter-
6. For a specific discussion of how the elimination of the purchaser-seller standing
rule affects potential damages see Note, Rule 10b-5: The Rejection of the Bimbaum
Doctrine by Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. and the Need for a New Limita-
tion on Damages, 1974 DuKr L.J. 610.
7. See 1 A. BRomBERo § 2.5(6) reporting that "10b-5 is generating almost as much
litigation as all the other general antifraud provisions together, and several times as
much as the express liabilities." It has also been observed that "an extensive judicial
gloss has encrusted" rule lob-5 "with the result that 'A startling variety of everyday
transactions have turned out to'be "fraudulent" under SEC Rule lob-5.'" Rochez Bros.,
Inc. v. Rhoades, 353 F. Supp. 795, 797 (W.D. Pa. 1973) citing 1 A. BROMBERG § 1.1.
8. For a general discussion of the ways in which. lOb-5 has been contracted, see
Bromberg, Are There Limits to Rule iOb-5?, 29 Bus. LAw. 167 (Special Issue, March
1974) concluding that "Five years ago, we might have said that 10b-5-like the universe,
as some scientists conceive it-has limits, but they are expanding so fast, that we never
reach them. In part, this is still true, but there are now a few limits... which seem
relatively fixed and firm." Id. at 177.
9, See James v. DuBreuil, 500 F.2d 155, 159-60 (5th Cir. 1974); Kuehnert v. Tex-
star Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 1969); Wohl v. Blair & Co., 50 F.R.D. 89, 93
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
In pan delicto is used to bar recovery by a plaintiff who has knowingly participated
in the defendant's wrongdoing. The doctrine usually arises in lOb-5 suits where a de-
fendant gives the plaintiff a false inside tip which the plaintiff accepts, acts upon, and
then litigates when he discovers the information is false. Since the plaintiff has know-
ingly used alleged "inside" information, the above-cited courts have denied recovery.
But see Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y.. 1971) (de-
fense of in pari delicto must yield to policy of enforcing antifraud provisions); cf. Wolf
v. Frank, 477 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1973) (court declines to apply in pad delicto defense
to suit to enforce the registration requirements of the Securities Act). Authority for
declining to apply in par delicto steins from the Supreme Court's holding in Perma Life
Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968), where the defense was
not permitted in a suit alleging violations of the federal antitrust laws. In any event,
the doctrine is of marginal utility, in lob-5 suits because the factual situation to which
the doctrine would apply rarely arises.
See generally Bell, How to Bar an Uninnocent Investor-The Validity.of Common
Law Defenses to Private Actions Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 23 U. FLA.
L. REV. 1 (1970); Godfrey, Plaintiff's Conduct as a Bar to Recovery Under the Securi-
ties Acts: In Pari Delicto, 48 Tax. L. REy. 181 (1969); Comment, Demise of In Pari
Delicto in Private Actions Pursuant to Regulatory Schemes, 60 CAL. L. REv. 527, 579-'
95 (1972); Comment, Rule 10b-5: The In Par! Delicto and Unclean Hands Defenses,
58 CAL. L. REV. 1149 (1970); 1969 DuKE L, 7 832.
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preting those facts given to him. If the plaintiff alleges that he was the
victim of a fraudulent device or practice, he is required to show that
the fraud was perpetrated despite his own reasonable conduct. Like-
wise, a plaintiff may not invoke the equitable tolling doctrine to pre-
vent the statute of limitations from barring his action if he failed to
bring it within a reasonable time after discovery of the fraud or misre-
presentation or a reasonable time after the plaintiff should have dis-
covered the 1Ob-5 violation.
The recent plethora of case law has made it possible to formulate
general standards for determining whether a plaintiff has in fact satis-
fied his due diligence burden. Such a formulation should help all par-
ties engaged in securities transactions by setting forth the specific ele-,
ments of this emerging "code of conduct" for investors. To this end, it
will first be shown that the imposition of a due diligence requirement
is theoretically sound.10 The second section of this Note will then ex-
amine in detail the standards which investors must meet."
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
BEHIND THE DUE DILIGENCE BURDEN
Before inquiring into the exact scope of a plaintiff's due dili-
gence burden, it is necessary to demonstrate that an investor's con-
structive knowledge 12 justifies imposing such a burden on lOb-5
plaintiffs. Although the courts generally agree that this requirement is
proper, their reasoning has varied widely. This section of the Note will
describe the numerous judicial rationales employed, identify the ana-
lytical problems posed by many of them and suggest the appropriate
theoretical approach.
Constructive Knowledge of a Fraudulent Device or Practice
Often courts faced with non-diligent plaintiffs in fraudulent
scheme or device cases have employed such concepts as waiver,' 3
laches,' 4 and estoppel'5 in denying recovery.' 6 These doctrines, how-
10. See notes 12-43 infra and accompanying text.
11. See notes 44-134 infra and accompanying text. See also A. JACOBS, THP IM-
PACr OF RULE lOb-5 § 64.01[b][ii] at 3-172-3-174 (1st ed. 1974).
12. Constructive knowledge is defined as that which a person should know as op-
posed to what he does know. See 2 A. BROMBERO § 8.4 (531).
13. See, e.g., Ocrant v. Dean Witter & Co., 502 F.2d 854 (10th Cir. 1974); Hecht
v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified, 430 F.2d 1202
(9th Cir. 1970); cf. Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1974) (no waiver
found).
14. See, e.g., Ocrant v. Dean Witter & Co., 502 F.2d 854 (10th Cir. 1974); Hecht
RULE 10b-5
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ever, are actually of very limited utility, both because of the narrow
circumstances to which they apply and because of the substantial
theoretical problems concerning their applicability in lOb-5 suits.
Waiver, at least as construed by the Ninth Circuit, is limited to cases
where the plaintiff had actual, as opposed to merely constructive,
knowledge of the right in question.17 Problems are also raised by sec-
tion 29(a) of the Securities Exchange Act which voids waivers of the
rights granted by the Act.18 Laches and equitable estoppel, on the
other hand, require that the defendant have suffered some injury or
prejudice.' 9 Quite often, however, such detriment or injury is difficult
to show. 20 In addition, it is questionable whether laches can bar a
V. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified, 430 F.2d 1202
(9th Cir. 1970).
15. See, e.g., Ocrant v. Dean Witter & Co., 502 F.2d 854 (10th Cir. 1974); Landry
V. Hemphill, Noyes &_ Co., 473 F.2d 365 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1002 (1973);
Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified, 430 F.2d
1202 (9th Cir. 1970); cf. Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1974) (no
estoppel found).
16. See generally Note, Applicability of Waiver, Estoppel, and Laches Defenses to
Private Suits Under the Securities Act and S.E.C. Rule 10b-5: Deterrence and Equity
in Balance, 73 YALE LJ. 1477 (1964).
17. See Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 333 F.2d 568 (9th Cir. 1964).
18. Section 29(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (1970) pro-
vides:
Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive com-
pliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation there-
under, or of any rule of an exchange required thereby shall be void.
19. The Ninth Circuit, in Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir.
1970), has defined both estoppel and laches in the context of a lOb-5 suit:
The requirements of estoppel are set out in Hampton v. Paramount Pic-
tures, 9 Cir., 279 F.2d 100, 104 (1960):
"Four elements must be present to establish the defense of estoppel:(1) the party to be estopped must know the facts; (2) he must intend that
his conduct shall be acted on or must so act that the party asserting the
estoppel has a right to believe it is so intended; (3) the latter must be
ignorant of the true facts; and (4) he must rely on the former's conduct
to his injury" (citations omitted).
To invoke laches as a defense there must be (1) a lack of diligence by the
party against whom the defense is asserted, and (2) prejudice to the party as-
serting the defense. 430 F.2d at 1208.
20. In Royal Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 333 F.2d 568 (9th Cir. 1964), the defendant
corporation argued that it was building certain apartments at the time of the misrepre-
sentation and could have saved money by economizing on certain items, but did not do
so because of its reliance on the plaintiff's silence. The court rejected this argument
noting that economizing on the apartments would as a consequence have lessened the
sales price of the property. Thus any savings would have been offset by a lower price
and would not have truly benefited the corporation.
For a case where estoppel was more appropriately raised, see Hochfelder v. Ernst
& Ernst, 503, F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974), where it was alleged that the defendant ac-
counting firm negligently audited a wrongdoing brokerage house, thereby aiding and
abetting the fraudulent scheme of the brokerage firm's president involving some fake
escrow accounts. As a defense, Ernst & Ernst argued that it had sent requests for
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plaintiff seeking a legal remedy.21
An alternative rationale for barring suit by plaintiffs with con-
structive knowledge of a fraudulent scheme is to read into the first
and third clauses of rule lOb-5 the common law fraud requirement of
justifiable reliance. This approach is also suspect, however, because
it presumes an erroneous equivalence between the fraudulent scheme
or device clauses of rule lOb-5 and common law fraud actions.23
Constructive Knowledge of a Material Misrepresentation or Omission
Courts have offered several explanations why the plaintiff's con-
structive knowledge of an alleged material misrepresentation or omis-
sion should bar a lOb-5 cause of action. Waiver, laches and estoppel
have been suggested as rationales for denying recovery in these cases,
despite theoretical difficulties similar to those described above. 24 Sev-
eral courts and commentators have looked at the matter in terms of
the defendant's scienter or negligence, reasoning that where the plain-
tiff had easy access to the omitted or misrepresented information, the
defendant was under no duty to disclose it.25 The scienter-negligence
written confirmations to all of the brokerage firm's customers as to their accounts. None
of the plaintiffs bothered to report their escrow accounts. Ernst & Ernst thus contended
that it was misled to its detriment by the plaintiffs' non-diligent conduct. The Seventh
Circuit sent the case to trial to resolve whether the plaintiffs knew or should have known
they were to report the escrow accounts.
21. See 3 L Loss 1777. Professor Loss points out that while the equitable tolling
doctrine applies to both actions at law and in equity, the tolling doctrine is meant to
protect the reasonably diligent plaintiff. It does not, therefore, necessarily follow that
the plaintiff who seeks a legal remedy on a federal cause of action should be barred
by laches short of the expiration of the statutory period for bringing suit.
22. See W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 108 (4th ed. 1971).
23. Rule 15cl-7(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-7 (1974), for example, specifically de-
fines "churning" as a fraudulent device within the meaning of rule lOb-5. Yet it has
been held that in a churning case proof of specific or invidious intent to defraud is not
required, although such an intent would be necessary under common law fraud. More-
over, while a complainant alleging common law fraud has the burden of proving fraud
by clear, cogent and convincing evidence, a complainant alleging fraudulent churning ac-
tivity must merely meet a preponderance of the evidence standard. See Dzenits v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d 168, 171 n.2 (10th Cir. 1974).
Cf. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180 (1963) (no actual intent to
injure necessary in suit under similar clauses contained in Investment Advisers Act).
See generally 1 A. BRommrO § 2.7, comparing rule 10b-5 with common law fraud.
24. See notes 13-21 supra and accompanying text. For a discussion of waiver,
laches and estoppel in the context of a material misrepresentation and omission case,
see Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 333 F.2d 568 (9th Cir. 1964).
25. See, e.g., White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974) (defendant's duty of
disclosure depends, inter alia, on defendant's access to the information as compared with
plaintiff's access); Arber v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 830 (1974) (defendant has no duty to disclose routine corporate data easily
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requirement is itself a "creature of judicial inference;"2 6 the omission
or misrepresentation clause of rule lOb-5 makes no mention of a de-
fendant's intent or standard of care. The usual justification for the
inference is that since a private cause of action under 10b-5 is judi-
cially implied, courts, in accord with their notions of legislative in-
tent, may read into the action elements not expressly contained in the
language of the rule.28 The difficulty with this approach results from
confusion of two different "scienters." "Scienter" as an element under
rule 10b-5 means the lack of diligence, constructive fraud, or unrea-
sonable or negligent conduct of the defendant.29 Nothing in the tradi-
tional notion of scienter justifies an additional examination of the
plaintiffs scienter and then balancing the two. Thus, to say that a de-
fendant lacks scienter where the plaintiff has it (as evidenced by the
plaintiffs lack of diligence in failing to examine the easily accessible
omitted or misrepresented information) is to add a very new twist to
the traditional notion of scienter.
Other courts and commentators discuss the plaintiff's construc-
tive knowledge in terms of his "reasonable reliance" on the misrepre-
sentation or omission.30 The reliance requirement, like scienter-negli-
gence, also stems from judicial inference, borrowing from the
common law tort of deceit, since lOb-5 does not literally require a
showing of reliance.3 1 Whatever validity this rationale may once have
available to plaintiff); Kohler v. Kohler, 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963) (no duty of dis-
closure to plaintiff with years of intimate acquaintance with corporate affairs); Harnett
v. Ryan Homes, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 878 (W.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd, 496 F.2d 832 (3d Cir.
1974) (one insider cannot maintain suit against another since there is no duty to dis-
close information to one who reasonably should already be aware of it); Mann, Rule
10b-5, Evolution of a Continuum of Conduct to Replace the Catch Phrases of Negli-
gence and Scienter, 45 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1206, 1215 (1970) ("the defendant will be held
to a lower standard of conduct as the sophistication of the plaintiff and his ability to
protect his own interests increases.").
26. Comment, Negligent Misrepresentations Under Rule 10b-5, 32 U. CM. L.
Rav. 824, 827-28 n.16 (1965).
27. See note 1 supra for text of Rule lOb-5.
28. See Comment, supra note 26.
29. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 855 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
30. Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971) (seller can-
not claim reliance on deceptive press release after curative release has been issued and
should have been assimilated); Comment, Reliance Under Rule lOb-5: Is the "Reason-
able Investor" Reasonable?, 72 COLUM. L. RaV. 562 (1972). See also A. JACOBS, supra
note 11, § 64.01[b][iii] (discussion of "justifiable reliance").
Some courts have held both that the defendant was under no duty of disclosure and
that the plaintiff was not reasonably entitled to rely on the nondisclosure where the
plaintiff did not himself reasonably investigate. See, e.g., Niedermeyer v. Niedermeyer,
[1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. RnP. 11 94,123 at 94,500-01 (D. Ore. 1973).
31. 3 L. Loss 1765-66; Stoll, Reliance as an Element in 1Ob-5 Actions, 53 ORE. L.
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had, it has become subject to serious doubt since the Supreme Court's
recent holding in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States32 that, at
least in omission cases, positive proof of actual reliance is not a pre-
requisite to recovery.33 Because of Affiliated Ute, it is no longer possi-
ble to base a due diligence burden upon the necessity of reliance when
the plaintiff alleges a material omission. In view of the uncertain fu-
ture of the reliance requirement in other lOb-5 actions, it cannot be
assumed that this particular rationale for imposing due diligence stan-
dards will survive in misrepresentation cases either.3 4
Perhaps as a consequence of Affiliated Ute, some courts have
suggested that a plaintiff's knowledge bears on the materiality re-
quirement of a lOb-5 suit which alleges a material omission or misre-
presentation.3 5 Materiality is generally defined as whether a reasona-
ble investor might consider the fact important to his investment
decision.3 6 The courts which view a plaintiff's knowledge in terms of
materiality then read into this definition of materiality the assumption
that investors would vary as to their diligence; certain investors, in or-
der to be reasonable, would "more diligently test the reliability and
completeness of representations made concerning a proposed transac-
tion before considering them important. ' 37 This reasoning, however,
seems an unwarranted stretch of the definition of materiality and un-
necessarily confuses materiality with due diligence. An investor might
reasonably deem a representation of great importance were it true,
yet, at the same time, realize that the representation was so outrageous
that it could not reasonably be believed. Thus, a misrepresentation
Rnv. 169, 171 (1974). For some evidence that reliance is intended by the legislature
to be an element, an analogy may be drawn to section 9 of the Securities Exchange Act,
15 U.S.C. § 78i (1970), which gives a private cause of action against market manipu-
lators. Although section 9 says nothing about reliance, a legislative report states that
in such cases the burden is on the plaintiff to show that he relied on the defendant's
act. See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934).
32. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
33. All that is necessary is that the omission be material. See id. at 153-54.
34. For a good discussion of the status of reliance after Affiliated Ute see Note,
The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule lob-5, 88 HAIv. L.
Rv. 584 (1975).
35. See, e.g., Bragalini v. Biblowitz [1973-74 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L.
REP. 1 94,371, at 95,267 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (none of the alleged omissions found material
since reasonable stockholders should know of the poor financial condition of the corpo-
ration); Taylor v. Smith, Barney & Co., 358 F. Supp. 892, 896 n.11 (D. Utah 1973)
(discussions of reasonable reliance are nothing more than discussions of materiality
under another name); Stoll, supra note 31, at 181.
36. See 406 U.S. at 153-54 (1972); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965); Taylor v. Smith, Barney & Co., 358 F.
Supp. 892, 895 (D. Utah 1973).
37. See, e.g., Taylor v. Smith, Barney & Co., 358 F. Supp. 892, 895 (D. Utah 1973).
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could be material yet not actionable because the plaintiff failed in his
due diligence burden.8 Moreover, tying materiality to the plaintiff's
sophistication might logically mean that more information should be
disclosed to sophisticated investors than to unsophisticated ones since
only the former group could appreciate disclosure of highly technical
investment information.
Due Diligence as a Separate Element
In place of the welter of rationales derived from the individual
elements of rule lOb-5, some courts have adopted the approach of
treating plaintiffs' due diligence as a totally separate element of a lOb-
5 cause of action.39 Because of the applicability of this rationale to all
of the rule's provisions, its potential utility is evident. The approach is
also theoretically impeccable. Creating a due diligence element for
10b-5 suits would not be an unwarranted judicial assumption of legis-
lative prerogative, since the courts have already created the elements
38. See A. JACOBS, supra note 11, § 64.01[b][iii]. The author offers as an example
a representation that the company had developed a way to convert air into gold at a
cost of 15 cents per pound. See id. at 3-176 n.14. The representation is material since
a reasonable investor would attach great weight to it if true, yet no reasonable person
would believe it.
39. See, e.g., Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 409-10 (3d Cir. 1973);
Jackson v. Oppenheim, [Current Transfer Binder] CCH FED. S.C. L. REP. 94,894 at
97,041-43 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 1974). Both cases contain a separate subheading dis-
cussing "due care."
See also Note, supra note 34, at 603-06 (1975), where the author recognizes the
plaintiff's lack of due diligence as simply an affirmative defense in lOb-5 suits. The
author draws an analogy to contributory negligence and reasons that, in light of the de-
terrent purposes of 10b-5, it would be anomalous to impose a stricter standard on the
plaintiff to establish a claim for securities fraud than the common law imposes for negli-
gence claims. Id. at 606. However, it might also be argued that, inasmuch as a lOb-
5 suit is not a simple negligence action, more of a burden can fairly be put on the plain-
tiff. Most courts seem to consider due diligence as an element of the plaintiff's case,
either by specifically denominating due diligence as an "element", or by tying due dili-
gence to some other element such as scienter, reliance or materiality, see notes 24-38
supra and accompanying text.
This commentator also states that the due diligence defense would not apply in the
open market context where the plaintiff is injured only by the fact that other investors
have acted on the defendant's deception, thereby interfering with the "true" market price
of the stock. Id. at 605. However, it is easy to imagine situations where due diligence
would be raised even in the open market context One possible scenario: defendant
falsely informs a large investor that X Co. stock is about to rise dramatically; the large
investor buys, forcing the market price up. Plaintiff then hears from a friend, an insider
in X Co., that management is concerned about the peculiar rise in the market price.
Despite this warning that the market price may be artificially inflated, plaintiff pur-
chases. The deception is then discovered and the market price bottoms out. In the en-
suing litigation, it would seem reasonable to allow defendant to raise plaintiff's failure
to exercise due care in making his purchase.
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of reliance and scienter-negligence in 10b-5 suits. It has been general-
ly accepted that these judicial creations are proper. The argument is
this: Since it was the courts which originally implied a private right of
action under rule 10b-5, they are empowered to define its elements in
such a way as to effectuate legislative policy. This reasoning applies
with full force to the creation of a due diligence requirement for plain-
tiffs. Such a requirement clearly complies with the recognized legisla-
tive policy of equalizing access to information; full disclosure is un-
necessary where both plaintiff and defendant have access to all
material facts. 40
Constructive Knowledge and the Statute of Limitations
A due diligence requirement for plaintiffs has also appeared in
the context of applying the statute of limitations. The problem arises
when the statute of limitations has run, and the plaintiff seeks to es-
cape its effect by invoking the equitable tolling doctrine. This doc-
trine, originally announced by the Supreme Court in Bailey v.
Glover,41 states that the statute of limitations will not begin to run
against a party injured by fraud until the fraud is discovered, provided
that his prior ignorance of the fraud did not result from his lack of dil-
igence. The statute will be tolled even though there are no special ef-
forts by the party committing the fraud to conceal it from the other
party.42 This doctrine applies to all federally created remedies and is
thus applicable in 10b-5 suits, although the actual statute of limita-
40. There is authority for the view that the purpose of rule 10b-5 is to assure equal
access to information. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969):
[Tihe Rule is based in policy on the justifiable expectation of the securi-
ties marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have rela-
tively equal access to material information. . . . The essence of the Rule is
that anyone who, trading for his own account in the securities of a corporationhas "access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be available only
for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone" may not
take "advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with
whom he is dealing. .... "
See also 1 A. BROMBERG §§ 3.2(300)-(400) (rationale of rule is equalization of informa-
tion). Although 10b-5 has been termed a full disclosure rule, disclosure is not neces-
sarily mandated by the rule since an investor may elect to abstain from trading rather
than disclose inside information.
Some courts have gone so far to say that the rule protects only "conscientious buy-
ers and sellers in good faith." See, e.g., City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221,
230 n.10 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970); Branham v. Material Systems
Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1048, 1056 (S.D. Fla. 1973). A due diligence requirement would
also encourage investors to be more careful in securities transactions, thereby preventing
frauds at the outset.
41. 88 U.S. 342 (1874).
42. Id. at 348. The rule applies to suits both in equity and at law. Id. at 349.
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tions employed in such suits is that of the state.4 3
EXTENT OF THE DUE DILIGENCE BURDEN
Given that rule 10b-5 justifies the imposition of a burden on
plaintiffs to search out certain facts relevant to the advisability of a
purchase or sale of securities and to act in a reasonable manner so as
to prevent the perpetration of fraudulent schemes, the exact extent of
that burden remains to be determined. Obviously a plaintiff's due dili-
gence burden can only be determined under the peculiar circum-
stances of each case; that burden will grow as the plaintiffs opportu-
nity to detect the misrepresentation or prevent the fraud increases.
However, the great majority of plaintiffs will fall into one of several
very broad categories, each including members similarly situated as to
the types of available information. For this reason, it is possible to de-
scribe in general terms the standards of inquiry which will be imposed
upon investors in a given class. Accordingly, this section of the Note
will consider how the due diligence requirement varies according to the
plaintiff's position as (1) a corporate insider; (2) an investor with
special experience or expertise; or (3) an "ordinary" investor.
Insider Plaintiffs. An insider is usually thought of as an officer
or director of a corporation but may actually be any person who, be-
cause of his position or intimate association with a corporation, has
special knowledge of corporate financial affairs. 4" The following dis-
cussion is limited to officers and directors since no cases appear to
have arisen involving other types of corporate insiders. 45
Some courts have flatly asserted that one insider cannot recover
from another.4 6 However, this statement is clearly too broad as no
court has actually so held, at least in the absence of other factors.
A more reasonable view, and a more accurate statement under the exist-
ing cases, would be that an insider has a stringent but not impossible
43. See de Haas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1226 (10th Cir. 1970);
Azalea Meats, Inc. v. Muscat, 386 F.2d 5, 8 (5th Cir. 1967).
44. Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 739 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951
(1968); Harnett v. Ryan Homes, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 878, 886 (W.D. Pa. 1973), afj'd,
496 F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1974).
45. Presumably other insiders, such as controlling shareholders, would have a lesser
due diligence burden than officers and directors. The right of a shareholder to inspect
corporate records, for example, is only a qualified right while a director's inspection
right is absolute. See notes 51 and 113 infra and accompanying text. Nor would a
controlling shareholder necessarily be in a position to receive "office information." Cf.
notes 58-60 infra and accompanying text.
46. E.g., Harnett v. Ryan Homes, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 878, 885 (W.D. Pa. 1973),
aff'd, 496 F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1974).
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duty of investigation and may still recover if the nondisclosure or mis-
representation related to something that not even an insider could [have
detected], or if the defendant's fraud were not made possible by the offi-
cer's or director's lack of diligence.
Corporate Books and Records and Corporate Meetings. If an
insider is an officer or director, he will be chargeable with notice of all
facts which the corporate records and meetings at which he was in at-
tendance would "fairly disclose. '47 For example, in Jackson v. Op-
penheim,48 the plaintiff, a partner in the law firm of Rogers & Wells,
purchased stock in Chelsea House Educational Communications,
Inc., of which he was an officer and director. He alleged that the sell-
er, a vice president and director of Chelsea House, failed to disclose
Chelsea's financial difficulties.49 The court, however, denied recov-
ery, finding that the plaintiff, albeit an outside director, had access to
corporate books and records which would have revealed that Chelsea
was at the end of its credit line and current liabilities exceeded current
assets by $500,000.50 This decision logically follows from the fact
that state law gives directors an absolute right to inspect corporate
books and records and that such directors will generally not be put to
undue effort in order to exercise that right.5 ' Furthermore, it is rea-
sonable to assume that anyone serving as a director should have ac-
quired the requisite expertise to understand the records.2 However, if
47. Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 736 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951
(1968); Niedermeyer v. Niedermeyer [1973 Transfer Binder] CCII FED. SEc. L. Ra,.
f 94,123 at 94,501 (D. Ore. 1973).
48. [Current Transfer Binder] CCH RF. SEC. L. REP. 94,894 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
21, 1974).
49. Id. at 97,037.
50. Id. at 97,042. For a further discussion of this case see note 60 infra.
51. See W. CaRY, CASES AND MATERimS ON ConpoRAIoNs 1027-28 (4th ed., un-
abridged, 1969); 1 G. HoRssmrTn, CORPORATON LAw AND PRAc CE § 421 (1959).
It is interesting to note that in Jackson the bookkeeper of Chelsea testified she
would have denied access to the corporate records to both plaintiff and defendant until
the president's approval was obtained. The court did not discuss this point since there
was no evidence that the plaintiff had even sought access. However, if the plaintiff
could have shown that the presideht would, in fact, have denied access to the plaintiff
but not to the defendant, then the case might have come out differently. See note 53
infra and accompanying text.
52. In Jackson the court pointed out that the plaintiff "admittedly possessed a high
degree of sophistication with regard to corporate matters as evidenced by his service as
director on the boards of approximately ten companies." [Current Transfer Binder],
CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 94,894, at 97,042.
Even if the plaintiff does not have the expertise to thoroughly understand corporate
financial records, many statutes permit the director to inspect the records through an
agent or attorney. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 3004 (West 1955). Many statutes
also give the director the right to make extracts. See id.
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the plaintiff director can establish that he is a mere "dummy," is not
given a responsible role, and has no easy physical access to the corpo-
rate books and records, then the plaintiff should be able to recover
against an insider for misrepresentations of the corporate financial
picture.5 3 Even though directors have the legal right to examine cor-
porate records, they should not be forced to sue for inspection rights
merely to preserve their recovery in future lawsuits.
Insiders have also been charged with knowledge which should
have been acquired at corporate meetings which they attended. In
Niedermeyer v. Niedermeyer,5 4 an executive vice-president and direc-
tor alleged that a purchase of company stock from his brother, the
president, was caused by material misrepresentations and omissions
relating to the amount of corporate assets. The overstatement of assets
resulted from careless inventory counts and from the corporation's
practice of pre-invoicing.rs Both problems had been brought out at a
meeting with bank officials who were worried about credit which had
been extended to the corporation. Finding that the plaintiff was
present at this meeting, the court concluded that the plaintiff Was put
on notice that the corporate assets might not be accurately stated.5"
Recovery was thus denied. A different conclusion might have been
reached if the plaintiff had not actually been present at the bank
meeting, since apparently no minutes of the meeting were kept. If the
pre-invoicing and careless inventory counts had been raised at a direc-
tors' meeting, however, then even an absent director would be put on
notice because the minutes would be part of the corporate records to
which he had access. 57
53. Cf. Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 736 n.11 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 951 (1968) (dictum); Taylor v. Janigan, 212 F. Supp. 794 (D. Mass. 1962), on
damages, 230 F. Supp. 858 (D. Mass. 1964), modified as to damages, 344 F.2d 787 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965). In the latter case the court, in allowing the
plaintiff to recover, may also have been influenced by the fact that even if the plaintiffs
had had access to the corporate books they would not have learned the truth, since the
defendant had manipulated the figures in order to show lower profits. See also Thomas
V. Duralite Co., Inc., 386 F. Supp. 698 (D.N.J. 1974) (plaintiff who left the company
and his position as executive vice-president three years before the sale of his stock and
who thereafter no longer had access to monthly status reports is not chargeable with
notice that financial condition of company had turned around).
54. [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. RP. f 94,123 (D. Ore. 1973).
55. Pre-invoicing is the practice of preparing an invoice on an order and sending
it to the bank for credit before the order is actually shipped. The practice results in
an increase in assets without a corresponding decrease in inventory.
56. [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. RE'. 11 94,123 at 94,497, 94,501.
57. But see Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260 (1st Cir. 1966). Plaintiff and de-
fendants, all M.I.T. doctoral candidates, organized a corporation for the development of
aluminum products. After some technological improvements, the plaintiff wrote Rey-
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Office Information. A few courts have gone beyond the rule
charging officers and directors with notice of corporate records and
meetings and have charged an officer with knowledge of certain types
of "office information" as well. In Harnett v. Ryan Homes, Inc.,5 8 an
executive vice-president of marketing for Ryan Homes, a land devel-
opment company, alleged that he sold his stock back to the corpora-
tion because of misrepresentations and omissions by the president.
One allegation was that the defendant failed to inform the plaintiff of
a lucrative option which Ryan Homes had been assigned. The court
found, however, that the option had been discussed at a special meet-
ing of the board of directors almost five months before the plaintiffs
stock sale. Although the court admitted that the plaintiff was not a di-
rector (and thus apparently did not attend the meeting), it deemed it
improbable that the plaintiff "could have missed such knowledge."5
This conclusion is probably correct in view of the fact that the plain-
tiff was a full-time officer, the option proved beneficial to the corpo-
ration and was thus newsworthy, and the information had undoubted-
ly been a conversation topic for almost five months.6"
nolds Metal Co., which expressed interest but demanded a release before negotiations
could proceed. Negotiations were therefore dropped. Soon afterwards, plaintiff and de-
fendants had a falling out and plaintiff was dismissed as president and secretary, al-
though he still remained a director. Id. at 262. About four months later the plaintiff
sold his stock for what he later discovered to be an unfortunately low price. He then
brought suit, alleging that the defendants had omitted to inform him that negotiations
with Reynolds had been revived. Id. at 263. The court, however, found that the nego-
tiations with Reynolds had been discussed at a board meeting of which the plaintiff had
notice but declined to attend; in fact, the plaintiff had made absolutely no effort to find
out what was going on in the corporation between the time he was dismissed as president
and the time he sold his stock. Id. at 267. Nevertheless, the court sent the case to
trial. The case can only be explained by noting that the plaintiff had alleged that any
inquiry would be useless because the defendants would not talk with him and that, if
he had attended the directors' meeting, the agenda would have been changed. Id. at
268. If a plaintiff's due diligence investigation would surely fail, then there is no reason
to require it.
58. 360 F. Supp. 878 (W.D. Pa. 1973), afl'd, 496 F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1974).
59. Id. at 887. Although the opinion is ambiguous, the court apparently did not
rest its holding on the alternative rationale that the information was contained in the
corporate minutes to which the plaintiff had access.
60. Id. ' Office information" may also reach outside directors. In Jackson, see
notes 48-53 supra and accompanying text, the plaintiff had also alleged that the defend-
ant seller failed to disclose certain mismanagement problems, for example, that the pub-
licity department at Chelsea ran costly ads in newspapers when the books which were
the subjects of the ads were not in the stores. It seems unlikely that an examination
of corporate records would have revealed such information. The court did find, how-
ever, that the plaintiff had, shortly before the sale, met with the plaintiff at the latter's
office and had at that time outlined some of his grievances against management. The
court thus found that the plaintiff was put on notice of the mismanagement problems.
[Current Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. f 94,894 at 97,042-43.
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Harnett can be contrasted with Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades,61
also decided by the Third Circuit. In that case the seller, a part-time
vice president and director, alleged that the president of the corpora-
tion purchased the plaintiff's stock without disclosing that he had
hired a finder to look for prospective purchasers and had already seri-
ously negotiated for the possible resale of all the stock. The court al-
lowed the plaintiff to recover, finding that none of the corporate
books, records or minutes which were available to the plaintiff con-
tained information regarding the defendant's negotiations with other
purchasers.6 2 Further, the information was not available to the plain-
tiff from any other "general office" source; the defendant had im-
posed controls over who could open the mail and had directed his
finder to remain silent when in the plaintiff's presence.63
Another decision illustrating the principle that an insider may
recover where the misrepresentations or omissions were not discovera-
ble from either corporate records and meetings or general office
sources is Myzel v. Fields,"4 where the seller was a member of the
board of directors and had been specially "trained in financial af-
fairs." The alleged nondisclosure, however, related to the identity of
the actual purchaser of the plaintiff's stock. Since "labyrinthine trans-
fers" hid the true identity of the purchaser "from even a most alert di-
rector," recovery was permitted. 6
Common Sense. The decision in Harnett also illustrates that an
insider must interpret those facts given to him with common sense
and, perhaps, cum grano salis. Among the alleged misrepresentations
in Harnett were that "Ryan Homes" would always be built in a certain
61. 491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1973).
62. Id. at 409-10.
63. Id. at 408 n.9. The opinion can be criticized, however, on "actual reliance"
grounds. From earlier negotiations authorized by the board of directors, the plaintiff
knew that the defendant had valued a 50 percent interest in the company to a possible
outside purchaser at $1.75 million; this the plaintiff considered "ludicrously high." Id.
at 410-11.
What makes the decision even more questionable is the way in which the court com-
puted the plaintiff's damages. Although the defendant received an offer of approxi-
mately $2 million for all the stock (both plaintiff and defendant had each held 50 per-
cent) a short time after the plaintiff's sale, the defendant did not accept this offer. In-
stead, the defendant accepted an offer of $4.25 million from a different purchaser some
seven months after the plaintiff had sold out. The Third Circuit awarded the plaintiff
half of the $4.25 million minus the $598,000 the plaintiff had received from the defend-
ant, despite evidence that it was the defendant's sole efforts which built the company,
in those seven months, into an enterprise worth over $4 million. Id. at 412.
64. 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
65. Id. at 736.
66. Id. at 737.
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new development area and that the corporation was going to merge
with SMAC (another corporation controlled by the defendant and
with which the plaintiff became associated after his stock sale67). As
to these alleged misrepresentations, the court held that the plaintiff
was experienced enough to appreciate the precarious nature of the
housing business. He knew it was impossible to lay concrete plans
in developing raw land of this size in the tenuous business circum-
stances of the mid-1960's. He knew of all the uncertainties involved:
that the Ryan Homes corporate entity might not exist from year to
year, or that the Board of Directors might change or obstruct the ,plans
which . . . [the defendant] envisoned; or that Edward Ryan might
become insolvent or fail in health or die.58
The decision appears reasonable since it should be generally accepted
that many propositions are affirmatively stated even though both de-
clarer and listener realize contingencies could arise to make the af-
firmative declaration false. The plaintiff in a 10b-5 suit for misrepre-
sentations should be held responsible for foreseeing obvious
complications which might arise and prevent fulfillment of a defend-
ant's projections.
A different conclusion should be reached, though, where a rep-
resentation is central to the transaction and where the plaintiff could
foresee a statement's possible falsity only by concluding that the de-
fendant had been lying. In such cases, the plaintiff should be allowed
to recover. For example, in Burns v. Paddock"9 certain officers and
directors alleged that they had been fraudulently induced to invest in
the company by other directors who were also the majority sharehold-
ers. The plaintiffs contended that the defendants had promised the es-
tablishment of a voting trust through which the plaintiffs, even
though minority shareholders, would control the company. 70 In fact,
no such trust was ever established. The defendants countered that the
plaintiffs should not have relied on the promise since the plaintiffs
knew that three out of the five trustees were to be the defendants or
those allied with them.7 1 The Seventh Circuit refused to dismiss the
67. 360 F. Supp. at 885.
68. Id. at 886. The merger never went through because SMAC had been threatened
with VA and FHA disqualification. In order to go public, Ryan Homes needed to disas-
sociate itself from SMAC. Id. at 883. This was apparently also the reason why the
trade name "Ryan Homes" was not retained in use at the new land development site.
Id. at 884.
69. [Current Transfer Binder) CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 94,789 (7th Cir. Sept. 5,
1974).
70. Id. at 96,617-18.
71. Id. at 96,619.
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action,7 finding it reasonable for the plaintiffs to believe that one of
the majority trustees would vote with the plaintiffs to ensure minority
control of the voting trust. Otherwise, the defendants' promise to give
the plaintiffs control would be meaningless. Only by assuming that
these assurances were falsely given could the plaintiffs have conclud-
ed that they would not control the corporation.73
Outsider Plaintiffs with Business or Investment Experience
Many cases have defined the due diligence obligation of "sophis-
ticated" outsiders, i.e., investors with greater than average financial
experience and understanding. Such plaintiffs, wherever feasible,
must try to obtain current financial information relating to the pro-
posed securities transaction. The sophisticated plaintiff will be
charged with knowledge of other types of information whenever the
plaintiff's particular kind of expertise relates to the alleged deception.
In suits involving brokerage house frauds, such as churning, the
courts, despite the fiduciary duty between broker and client, have
been hesitant to impose liability, finding that confirmation slips and
monthly statements should put the plaintiff with even minimal sophis-
tication on notice of the fraud.
Corporate Financial Information. Before making a purchase or
sale the investor with special expertise must at least seek current fi-
nancial data on the corporation. In fact, as to information equally
available to both groups, the due diligence burden of experienced
investors may be higher than that of insiders who lack such expertise.
On the other hand, it should be more difficult to charge sophisticated
outsiders with knowledge of corporate records and meetings to which
their access will generally be restricted in comparison with even an
unsophisticated insider.
One case illustrating the due diligence burden for experienced
investors is Lane v. Midwest Bancshares Corp.,74 wherein a stock
seller sought to recover on notes given by the purchaser while the lat-
ter counterclaimed for 10b-5 violations. Specifically, the purchaser al-
leged that certain liabilities had been omitted from the corporate bal-
ance sheet that he was shown. Although agreeing that the omission
was material, the court noted that both parties were "speculators and
shrewd dealers" and that the purchaser was, in fact, a specialist in ac-
72. Id. at 96,623.
73. Id. at 96,619.
74. 337 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Ark. 1972).
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counting and financial management. 75  Despite his expertise, the
counterclaimant bought the stock after only two hours of discussion
and without the presence or advice of counsel. 76 He had failed to in-
quire into the fact that the balance sheet was uncertified and over four
months old.77 Thus, the court concluded that the counterclaimant was
"either grossly negligent or was recklessly entering into a highly spec-
ulative transaction. . .. 7
This, of course, was a face-to-face transaction and the court
seemed to assume that the counterclaimant could have demanded and
received current certified financial information. If certified financial
statements do not exist, an otherwise similarly situated plaintiff
should not be denied recovery; only a person making a very large in-
vestment would have the "clout" to demand that certified statements
be obtained as a condition to his purchase. Lane should probably be
read as merely requiring the plaintiff investor to demand the best, up-
to-date financial information reasonably available to him.7 9 If that in-
formation is inaccurate but there is nothing on the face of it to arouse
suspicion, the investor should be held to have satisfied his due dili-
gence burden.
Such a reading would correspond with the recent Fifth Circuit
case of Vohs v. Dickson,"° in which a sophisticated investor was al-
lowed to recover. The plaintiff had purchased stock in Management
Science America, Inc., of which she was a project engineer. She spe-
cifically alleged that the defendant, a "'key' employee," ' failed to
75. Id. at 1205.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1206.
78. Id. at 1210.
79. See Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963) (no duty to disclose
certain financial information to a plaintiff who had years of intimate acquaintance with
the corporation's affairs, had extrinsic sources of such business advice, and was himself
promoting a speedy sale).
Cf. Stier v. Smith, 473 F.2d 1205 (5th Cir. 1973). There the court refused to
charge a sophisticated buyer with knowledge that the corporation had made a large loan
to another corporation for the express purpose of enabling the latter to buy stock in the
former's public offering. The court felt that, although the plaintiff had access to the
information, it was hidden in such a mountain of records that the plaintiff could not
easily discover it. Id. at 1208.
See also Barthe v. Rizzo, 384 F. Supp. 1063 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). In this suit by an
admittedly sophisticated investor, the plaintiff alleged that his broker failed to inform
him that he had an interest in the stock he sold to the plaintiff. The court allowed
recovery, finding that "one in a fiduciary relationship?' is not excused even though the
plaintiff-client "was not sufficiently suspicious to think of asking." Id. at 1067.
80. 495 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1974).
81. Id. at 623.
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disclose certain material financial data. The court quite willingly
pointed out that the plaintiff was a graduate of Duke University and
had had some banking experience before coming to MSA; further-
more, she had some $200,000 in personal stockholdings and thus was
apparently an investor of some experience.8 2 The plaintiff's brother
was a graduate of Harvard Business School and the president of a se-
curities brokerage and hedge fund corporation which had dealt with
MSA.88 Nevertheless, the court found that the plaintiff had satisfied
her burden of due care before entering into the transaction since she
had obtained a 1968 Annual Report which she sent to her brother for
review, 4 and had held more than one conversation with the secre-
tary-treasurer of the company "for the purpose of discussing MSA, its
stock and financial condition."8 8 In other words, it was sufficient that
the investor had at least made a reasonable effort to gather all current-
ly available financial data.
Even if the securities transaction is an impersonal market trans-
action, the experienced investor still must seek current financial infor-
mation from the company.8 It is only reasonable to place this due dil-
igence burden on the investor since the corporation cannot be
expected to know who is interested in its stock without receiving spe-
cific inquiries. 87
82. Id. at 611-12.
83. Id. at 612. One might question whether these facts alone made the plaintiff
an experienced investor with a higher burden of investigation. It is unclear whether the
plaintiff's stockholdings were merely inherited or were the result of her own efforts. It
also seems unfair to mark a plaintiff as sophisticated simply because a member of the
plaintiff's family has expertise. However, since the court seemed to treat the plaintiff
as a person with extra business sense, she will be so treated in the present discussion.
84. Id. at 614-15. It actually took some effort on the plaintiff's part to obtain the
report; her first request was rejected with the claim that the information sought was con-
fidential.
85. Id. at 623. Recovery was denied, however, on the ground that the defendant
had no more knowledge or access to the facts than the plaintiff had. But, in a sort
of Catch-22, the court also remarked in dictum that it was reluctant to place any burden
on the defendant to have analyzed and explained the footnotes and other financial infor-
mation in the 1968 Report when the plaintiff herself had, prior to the litigation, taken
it upon herself to ascertain the status of the company and its stock. Thus, it seems that
an educated and experienced investor is under a duty to carry out an investigation before
purchasing or selling securities, but if the investor does make such an investigation, then
the investor cannot later argue the defendant should have disclosed the information. See
A. JAcous, supra note 11, § 64.01[b][ii] at 3-174.
86. See Shahmoon v. General Dev. Corp., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FM.
Sm. L. REP. r 94,308 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The actual holding in Shahmoon is unclear
since the court also suggested that no omission even occurred and, further, that there
was no actual reliance on the omission since the plaintiff continued to buy the stock
in question even after he actually learned of the allegedly omitted fact.
87. Of course the corporation is still under an obligation not to make misrepresen-
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Other Misrepresentations and Omissions and Fraudulent De-
vices. Before a sophisticated outsider is charged with knowledge of
information other than financial data, it must be found that the plain-
tiff's experience or sophistication was of a type which would put him
on notice of the omitted or misrepresented information or fraudulent
scheme. One type of omission that probably all experienced investors
can appreciate is illustrated by Maine v. Leonard.88 This was a suit by
a former executive vice-president and chief engineer who alleged that
the purchaser of his stock failed to disclose an impending purchase of
the corporate assets by another corporation. The plaintiff sold his
stock through a broker, but since the plaintiff was a former insider,"'
and the stock was unregistered and restricted, he demanded and re-
ceived a letter of indemnification from the purchaser, whose identity
was unknown to him. The letter was kept in the broker's files. A
month after the sale, the local newspaper reported the purchase of as-
sets. The plaintiff admitted that after these newspaper reports he had
suspected an insider may have been involved in the purchase of his
stock. Yet the plaintiff waited nineteen months before writing to the
broker to request the name of the purchaser and, after the broker re-
fused, he waited another two years before making further inquiries.
Finding that the plaintiff possessed the "sophistication and expertise"
necessary to appreciate the meaning of these events,90 the court con-
cluded that the plaintiff had failed his due diligence burden of investi-
gation and refused to toll the statute of limitations which barred
recovery.91
tations or misleading statements in the information which it does release. See, e.g., SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969).
88. [1973-74 Transfer Binder] CCH FEE. SEC. L. REP. 1 94,407 (W.D. Va. 1973).
89. The plaintiff had left the corporation about three months before the stock sale.
Id. at 95,411.
90. Id. at 95,414.
91. Id. at 95,417. For another case where the plaintiff's expertise related to the
fraud perpetrated and thus barred recovery see Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine,
434 F.2d 100, 103-04 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971). The plain-
tiff brokerage firm alleged that certain defendants had created the illusion of financial
responsibility for another defendant, McAlpine, thereby inducing the plaintiff to permit
the latter to trade large volumes of securities. McAlpine purchased securities from the
plaintiff with personal checks, which the plaintiff continued to accept even after prior
checks had been dishonored for insufficient funds and even though regulations required
the plaintiff to freeze the customer's trading account for ninety days. Id. at 101-02.
But see Carroll v. First Nat'l Bank, 413 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1003 (1970). Certain "participants" here made large purchases of securities
through the plaintiff securities dealers, thereby driving up the price of the securities and
allowing the participants to pay for the original purchases by unloading the securities
at inflated prices. The participants were aided in the creation of this "credit bubble"
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On the other hand, in John R. Lewis, Inc. v. Newman" recovery
was permitted since the plaintiffs' expertise did not relate to the mis-
represented information. The plaintiff-buyers in the case were corpo-
rations engaged in the securities business and had been investing in
the stock in question for over ten years. They alleged that the seller,
an investor in close touch with corporate management, misrepresent-
ed that he was acting for the corporation and that the unregistered
shares he was offering could be later exchanged for registered shares.
These misrepresentations, the court found, were such that years of in-
vestment experience and past dealings between the plaintiffs and de-
fendant could not put the plaintiffs on notice that the defendant was
not telling the truth.93 If the plaintiffs had been connected with the
corporation, like the former insider in Maine, then the case should
have come out differently because the plaintiffs could easily have
checked to see if the shares were exchangeable. Even on the facts as
stated the decision is questionable. One wonders why the plaintiffs did
not even bother to verify the defendant's representations with the cor-
poration itself, particularly since the defendant made the unusual
promise that the shares were exchangeable.9"
Suits Against Brokerage Firms. Special problems have been
presented in the several cases involving allegations either of "churn-
ing" 5 of the plaintiff's account by a defendant broker-dealer or of un-
authorized or undermargined transactions in the account."0 These
by the defendant bank which held drafts sent by the plaintiffs as long as possible with-
out paying for the securities. Id. at 355. The court explicitly discounted the relevance
of the plaintiffs negligence in handling sales of securities, id. at 357-58, and refused to
dismiss the complaint. The Seventh Circuit has tended to require very little for a plain-
tiff's showing of due diligence. See notes 105-07 infra and accompanying text. The
court in Carroll did note however, in a confusing aside, that the plaintiffs' negligence
might be somehow relevant to the issues at a trial on the merits. Id. at 358.
92. 446 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1971).
93. Id. at 804.
94. See also Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Central Nat'l Bank, 409 F.2d 989 (5th Cir.
1969) (recovery by plaintiff bank which, although experienced in intricacies of loan par-
ticipation agreements, was located in small Pennsylvania town and thus "had no way
to independently verify the information supplied by [defendant] Central Bank which
was on intimate terms with the borrower." Id. at 993.)
95. "Churning" is defined as the overtrading of an account in order to generate
commissions. See 3 L. Loss 1479-80.
96. See, e.g., Ocrant v. Dean Witter & Co., 502 F.2d S54 (10th Cir. 1974); Mc-
Cormick v. Esposito, 500 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 834 (1975);
Dzenits v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d 168 (10th Cir. 1974);
Fey v. Walston, & Co., 493 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1974); Landry v. Hemphill, Noyes &
Co., 473 F.2d 365 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1002 (1973); Gammage v. Roberts,
Scott & Co., [Current Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. ReP. 94,760 (S.D. Cal.
June 13, 1974); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968),
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frauds usually take place over a period of time during which the
plaintiff is presumably being sent both monthly statements and con-
firmation slips.9" If the defendant can show that the plaintiff was ex-
perienced or sophisticated enough to appreciate the facts contained in
the statements or confirmations received, recovery may be denied on
the ground that the plaintiff, by his inaction, failed to satisfy his due
diligence burden. Thus, the only question is whether the plaintiff was,
in fact, sufficiently "experienced" or "sophisticated." In answering
this question, the courts have tended to be defendant oriented because
of the fact that the monthly statements provide the information neces-
sary for discovery of the fraud.
If the plaintiff or, as more typically happens, the plaintiff's
agent-husband is actually engaged in the securities business, it is
proper to presume that the plaintiff has the expertise to understand
the statements and recovery will be denied.98 If the plaintiff is not a
broker or regular speculator, then generally more evidence is required
before a court will hold that the plaintiff should have understood the
confirmation slips. A review of the cases will show that the judicial
approach has been a reasonable one. The First Circuit has found suf-
ficient evidence where the plaintiff was a high school graduate, was
engaged in the insulating, painting and carpentry contracting busi-
ness, earned between $15,000-$25,000, had been trading in the mar-
ket since the 1950's, subscribed to Barron's and the Wall Street Jour-
nal, had solicited investment advice, and had retained his
confirmation slips to prepare a list of current stockholdings, thereby
indicating he comprehended the information on the slips.99 In a suit
alleging margin violations, the Fifth Circuit held a plaintiff barred by
the due diligence requirement where he was a lawyer and had been
investing in the securities market since 1929.100 Thus, it can generally
modified, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970); Nash v. J. Arthur Warner & Co., 137 F. Supp.
615 (D. Mass. 1955); Carr v. Warner, 137 F. Supp. 611 (D. Mass. 1955).
97. If no confirmation slips and statements are sent, then the plaintiff, of course,
has a much better case. However, the defendant might still argue that the plaintiff was
sophisticated enough to appreciate the absence of the slips and should have made an in-
quiry.
98. See, e.g., Ocrant v. Dean Witter & Co., 502 F.2d 854 (10th Cir. 1974) (churn-
ing claim denied where plaintiffs agent-husband was active investor and licensed
broker); Gammage v. Roberts, Scott & Co., [Current Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc.
L. REP. 1 94,760 (S.D. Cal. June 13, 1974) (in suit alleging margin violations, plaintiff
denied recovery where her agent-husband held graduate degree from Harvard Business
School and made his living from speculating in the securities market).
99. Landry v. Hemphill, Noyes & Co., 473 F.2d 365, 373 n.10 (1st Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 414 U.S. 1002 (1973).
100. McCormick v. Esposito, 500 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct.
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be said that recovery will be denied when the plaintiff has been trad-
ing in the market for a substantial period of time and his occupation
or actions indicate a likely understanding of the monthly state-
ments.1"' However, since the issue of the plaintiff's sophistication is
an issue of fact, the Tenth Circuit has allowed a churning case to go to
trial even though plaintiff was a dentist and had been investing for
some ten years, in view of the additional fact that the plaintiff was a
native of Latvia and had come to the United States during World War
11.102 It was not made clear, however why the plaintiff's background
should have affected his understanding of confirmation slips since the
plaintiff had been in the United States for over twenty years.
If the plaintiff alleges "unauthorized transactions" in an ac-
count, less evidence of sophistication should be required since it is
easier to tell from a monthly statement whether trades have been
made which the investor did not authorize. Churning, on the other
hand, actually requires a comparison of monthly statements in order
to see how many times a stock has been turned over or how many
trades have been made during a substantial period of time. In Hecht
834 (1975). It is actually hard to tell in this case whether the plaintiff was denied re-
covery because he should have known his account was undermargined and failed to take
corrective action or because the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the violation. The
court simply states:
McCormick received a monthly statement of his account and was aware of
the varying equity-debit status of his account. He certainly had reason to
know when his account was undermargined, for as the district court found, "Mr.
McCormick is a lawyer, has been in and out of the securities market place
since 1929, personally maintained full control over his account, and was at all
times completely informed as to the securities position of his account." Id.
at 628.
For a case denying recovery to a plaintiff with actual knowledge of margin viola-
tions see Gordon v. duPont Glore Forgan, Inc., 487 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1973). The
court simply found it inequitable to allow a plaintiff who had gambled that his stock
would appreciate (so that he would not have to bolster his margin account) to recover
because the stocks fell so low that his margin account had a deficit. Id. at 1263. But
see Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970) (recovery for margin
violations permitted on ground that "the danger of permitting a windfall to an unscrupu-
lous investor is outweighed by the salutary policing effect which the threat of private
suits for compensatory damages can have upon brokers and dealers . I.."..d. at
1141).
101. One case has gone even further. In Nash v. I. Arthur Warner & Co., 137 F.
Supp. 615 (D. Mass. 1955), recovery was denied on a churning claim where one plain-
tiff, albeit with little formal education, was a successful plumbing contractor and had
borrowed money from a bank, pledging securities as collateral; the other plaintiff, pos-
sessing a sixth grade education, prepared tax returns for himself and relatives and kept
daily contact with newspaper reports of the prices of securities. See also Carr v. War-
ner, 137 F. Supp. 611 (D. Mass. 1955) (recovery denied housewife who was high school
graduate with twelve years experience of working at a bank).
102. Dzenits v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d 168, 170 (10th
Cir. 1974).
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v. Harris, Upham & Co. 10 3 the Ninth Circuit was willing to estop a rel-
atively inexperienced investor from denying that she knew the nature
of the transactions in her account because she had received confirma-
tion slips, but the court was careful to note that she would not be es-
topped from claiming that her account was traded excessively. 10 4
When churning is alleged, the degree of sophistication of the
investor can be an important factor. 0 5 In reversing a district court
which would not admit evidence of an investor's sophistication in a
churning case, the Seventh Circuit stated in Fey v. Walston & Co. 0 6
that "evidence bearing upon the experience, sophistication or trading
naivete of the customer may be highly significant.' 7
Ordinary Plaintiffs
Even "ordinary" plaintiffs, who by definition have no special
business or investment expertise and are neither officers nor directors,
must meet certain minimal standards in order to recover. In applying
the due diligence test to unsophisticated investors, courts have proper-
ly focused upon the plaintiffs' own unique knowledge and experience,
as well as upon their access to the relevant information. Furthermore,
it is evident from the recent decisions that a modicum of good judg-
ment will be required from even the most inexperienced investor.
Current Market Price and Book Value. At a minimum, due
diligence requires an ordinary investor to ascertain the current market
price of the stock, at least where it is readily available to the public in
103. 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970), modifying 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
The plaintiff, a former housekeeper who had married her former employer, was approxi-
mately sixty-five years old when she inherited a half million dollars worth of securities
from her husband. 283 F. Supp. at 424. During the almost seven years that her ac-
count was at Harris, Upham & Co., over 10,000 transactions occurred in it with a gross
dollar volume of $1100,000,000. Nearly ninety percent of these transactions were in
commodities. Id. at 425.
104. 430 F.2d at 1209.
105. Mrs. Hecht relied on the advice of her broker to the extent that he controlled
the volume and frequency of transactions. 283 F. Supp. at 431-32. Presumably, a more
sophisticated investor would fail in making this argument because such blind reliance
on his broker would not be reasonable. Cf. Gammage v. Roberts, Scott & Co.,
[Current Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. f 94,760 (S.D. Cal. June 13, 1974).
Unlike Mrs. Hecht, Mrs. Gammage was not under the control of her broker nor did
she place any great reliance on him. Id. at 96,503. Instead she was advised by her
husband-agent who had over 20 years experience in dealing in securities. Id. at 96,500.
Therefore, Mrs. Gammage was unsuccessful in claiming that she was unaware of the
transactions taking place in her account.
106. 493 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1974).
107. Id. at 1045.
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the National Daily Quotation Sheets.' This requirement typically is
imposed when the plaintiff has carelessly sold his stock below market
value; a plaintiff may also be charged with knowledge of the current
market price when he seeks to overcome the bar of the statute of limi-
tations. For example, in Hupp v. Gray'0 9 the plaintiff alleged that he
was induced to purchase shares in a variable annuity insurance com-
pany by a stockbroker's misrepresentation that the Chicago School
Board was about to execute a contract with the insurance company
for a group policy covering thousands of teachers and that the market
price of the stock would consequently soar.110 In reality, after the
plaintiff completed his purchases, the market price fell drastically and
the plaintiff was eventually forced to sell."' However, the plaintiff
waited four more years before filing his complaint. Reasoning that
even a wholly unsophisticated investor should have realized that he
was defrauded when the stock price plunged rather than soared, the
court refused to toll the statute of limitations and denied
recovery.112
Charging ordinary plaintiffs with knowledge of publicly availa-
ble market prices seems to be a wholly reasonable requirement, since
every investor should have access to a newspaper and no particular
expertise is needed to understand the daily quotations. A more diffi-
cult question is whether to charge a plaintiff with knowledge of the
book value of the stock of a closely held corporation."13 If the plaintiff
is a seller, the extent of the due diligence burden should depend on his
access to the information." 4 This was the approach taken by the Sixth
108. See Hafner v. Forest Laboratories, Inc., 345 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1965).
109. 500 F.2d 993 (7th Cir. 1974).
110. Id. at 995.
111. When the plaintiff completed his purchases the market price was $47.00. Al-
though the defendant had predicted the market price would soon rise to $75.00, a year
later the price was down to $17.50. The plaintiff then sold. Id.
112. Id. at 997.
113. Shareholders, of course, do not have an absolute right to inspect corporate books
and records. Although statutes vary, a shareholder may have the burden of alleging and
proving good faith and proper motive for the inspection. See Starr & Schmidt, Inspec-
tion Rights of Corporate Stockholders: Toward a More Effective Statutory Model, 26
U. FLA. L. Rv. 173 (1974). Because corporations have so little to lose in resisting
a shareholder seeking to enforce his right of inspection, the shareholder often encounters
considerable delay before gaining access to the books. See id.
Professor O'Neal suggests that the charter of a close corporation should give its
shareholders greater rights of inspection than the shareholders of a public corporation
would have by statute or common law. 1 F. O'NnAL, CLOSE CORPORIONS § 3.63
(1971).
114. The courts will not always aid the shareholder in getting this information. See
State ex rel. Jones v. Ralston Purina Co., 358 S.W.2d 772 (Mo. 1962) (shareholder's
inspection right does not extend to preliminary profit and loss statement, a monthly
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Circuit in Arber v. Essex Wire Corp.,"5 where the court specifically
found that the information was easily available and that the plaintiff
knew of its availability. No cases appear to have arisen where the
plaintiff was buying into a close corporation. However, it would seem
equitable to require that the buyer at least have made a reasonable in-
quiry into the book value of the stock. If such an inquiry would not
have uncovered the material information, recovery should be
allowed.
Other Misrepresentations and Omissions and Fraudulent De-
vices. Beyond knowledge of market price and (at least in some
cases) book value, the ordinary investor will be charged with whatever
knowledge reasonable diligence would have gleaned from the facts of
each case. Most of the cases have been clear cut. For example, an or-
dinary investor has been held obliged to discover a curative corporate
press release within four days of its issuance." 6 The investor may also
be under a duty to discover, after a period of time, that a stock pur-
chaser misrepresented the individual on whose behalf he was acting.
Such a duty was imposed in Morgan v. Koch," 7 where the plaintiff, a
psychiatrist, sold her stock to the defendant on the condition that the
defendant was not associated with the plaintiff's brother, the president
of the corporation, with whom the plaintiff was feuding. The defend-
ant falsely represented that he was not connected with the brother and
would not retain him in the management structure. Three years after
the statute of limitations had run, the plaintiff finally brought suit.
The court intimated that the plaintiff should have suspected the truth
before the actual sale was made; the evidence indicated that the plain-
tiff's brother headed a voting trust that was to remain in effect for an-
other nine years, and thus a reasonable seller would have inferred that
the purchase was not being made for the defendant." 8 But, more im-
portantly, the court found that the plaintiff could easily have discov-
profit analysis and detailed balance sheet); Baron v. Royal Paper Corp., 36 App. Div.
2d 112, 318 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1971) (shareholder in close corporation selling his shares
to the corporation pursuant to a buy-out agreement not allowed to examine books to see
if they accurately reflected the book value). But see Waldman v. Eldorado Towers, 25
App. Div. 2d 836, 270 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1966).
A shareholder should not be forced to give up a possible sale simply because the
corporation is interposing unreasonable delay in allowing the plaintiff to inspect the rec-
ords to determine book value. This principle would be especially applicable where the
defendant buyer was the corporation itself, as well as where the buyer is an insider with
knowledge of book value which he does not disclose to the plaintiff.
115. 490 F.2d 414 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 830 (1974).
116. See Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971).
117. 419 F.2d 993 (7th Cir. 1969).
118. Id. at 997-98. See also notes 131-34 infra and accompanying text.
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ered that her brother was retained as chief executive after the sale.
Newspapers published stories that the brother was to remain in the
corporation, and the plaintiff frequently visited relatives who lived
near the corporation's headquarters. 1 Because of the extremely
strong evidence of constructive knowledge, the plaintiff's suit was
barred by the statute of limitations.
In addition, even unsophisticated plaintiffs may be charged with
knowledge of elementary technical matters which they had ample op-
portunity to discover. For example, an ordinary investor has been
placed under a duty to discover the redemption procedure applicable
to his convertible bonds, at least where sufficient information is given
in the prospectus and on the bonds themselves.12 0  A plaintiff cannot
simply deposit the bonds in his safe deposit box without reading them
and then be heard to complain when the bonds are redeemed before
he has a chance to convert. On the other hand, an ordinary investor
has no duty to find out more esoteric information, such as the fact that
unregistered stock held by other investors might be sold under SEC
Rule 144 and that such sales could negatively affect the market price
of common stock purchased by the plaintiff.' 21 Such knowledge
would require more than a passing acquaintance with the securities
laws, while every investor in convertible bonds should realize he must
familiarize himself with the redemption procedure.
All of these cases seem relatively straightforward. Other cases
have arisen, however, where proper resolution of the due diligence is-
sue has presented greater difficulty. In Bird v. Ferry,'22 for example,
a securities salesman who had served as an investment adviser for the
"Twenty-Ten Investment Club" managed to abscond with all of the
club's funds. He accomplished this by placing the club's portfolio in
his own personal account and furnishing bogus statements to the club
tracing the vicissitudes of -their non-existent stocks. 23 Although the
club members included "a lawyer, a doctor, a bank teller, two real es-
119. Id. at 998. For another case holding that the plaintiff investor failed to exer-
cise due diligence see Branham v. Material Systems Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1048 (S.D. Fla.
1973); cf. Baumel v. Rosen, 412 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1969) (plaintiffs denied remedy
of rescission where they waited almost three years after the time plaintiff-sellers ad-
mitted they realized they had been "taken" before bringing suit).
120. See Abramson v. Burroughs Corp., [1971-72 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
Ra,. ff 93,456 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
121. See Langert v. Q-1 Corp., [1973-74 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
fr 94,445 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). For other cases where ordinary investors have satisfied their
due diligence burden see deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir.
1970); Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 333 F.2d 568 (9th Cir. 1964).
122. 497 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1974).
123. Id. at 113-14.
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tate brokers, two pharmacists, and the president of a corporation,"'124
the club carelessly let the stocks fall into the defendant Ferry's hands
when Ferry changed employers. Instead of instructing the former em-
ployer to transfer the club's stock directly to the new employer to be
held in a street name, the club treasurer merely requested a transfer to
Ferry himself, albeit with the presumption that Ferry would ultimate-
ly transfer the stocks on his own. 125 No club member, however, ever
asked for a confirmation of the transfer or a broker's receipt for the
stock.126 Perhaps even more negligently, the club members never re-
quested confirmations of any authorized purchases and sales, al-
though the club treasurer testified that he knew what confirmation
slips were.127 In addition, there was evidence that Ferry had mishan-
dled $5,000 in funds belonging to one club member who "felt Ferry
stole his money and may have told other members of his suspi-
cions.' 128 Despite all these acts of gross negligence, the majority con-
cluded that recovery was justified by Ferry's "quasi-fiduciary posi-
tion."' 29 But, in view of the professional occupations of the plaintiffs,
it is difficult to justify such blind reliance.' 30
Common Sense. As in the case of insiders' 3 ' and sophisticated
investors, 32 the ordinary investor's due diligence burden goes beyond
making a reasonable inquiry; he must also apply his common sense to
the facts that are given to him. This principle is most important where
the plaintiff alleges that he was misled by extravagant claims. While
the ordinary investor need not exhibit sophisticated business sense, he
should realize that predictions of extraordinary profits are, at least in
certain industries, to be skeptically received. For example, in Ferland
v. Orange Groves of Florida, Inc. 33 the plaintiff alleged that litera-
124. Id. at 114 (dissenting opinion of Judge Coleman).
125. Id. at 115 (dissenting opinion of Judge Coleman).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 116 (dissenting opinion of Judge Coleman).
128. Id. at 114.
129. Id.
130. Judge Coleman wrote a vehement dissent in Bird finding a complete lack of dili-
gence on the plaintiffs' part. Id. at 114-20. However, even Judge Coleman considered
the lack of diligence to be no defense as to Ferry's liability, but only as to the liability
of Robinson-Humphrey under the controlling persons provision of the securities laws.
15 U.S.C. § 78t (1970). Nor would Judge Coleman have allowed plaintiffs' carelessness
to be raised on the common law counts of fraud and respondeat superior against Robin-
son-Humphrey.
131. See notes 67-71 supra and accompanying text.
132. Actually, no cases appear to have arisen involving the duty of sophisticated
plaintiff investors to apply their common sense in interpreting information supplied to
them in a securities transaction. Undoubtedly, however, placing such a burden on
sophisticated investors would be reasonable.
133. 377 F. Supp. 690 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
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ture used in the sale of orange grove interests portrayed an "over-ro-
seate" view of the citrus industry. The court, however, declined to in-
terpret the language as a guarantee of future profits, reasoning that,
because of the nature of the investment and its dependence on weath-
er and other risks of nature, "an average prudent investor would rec-
ognize any guarantee of profits as a manifest impossibility."'-8 4 In a
declining economy, this principle might well be extended to almost
every industry, with the result that plaintiffs should find it increasing-
ly more difficult to base 10b-5 suits upon allegations that handsome
returns on their investment were guaranteed.
CONCLUSION
It is becoming increasingly rare for courts to allow recovery un-
der rule 10b-5 without scrutinizing the plaintiff's conduct as well as
that of the defendant. The principle that only those investors who
have acted reasonably should prevail in 10b-5 suits is now firmly es-
tablished. This Note has attempted to show that the imposition of
such a due diligence requirement upon plaintiffs is an appropriate
way of defining a judicially created remedy in accordance with legis-
lative policy. Of course, any test which requires "reasonable" conduct
has meaning only in light of the specific circumstances of individual
cases. However, 10b-5 cases generally show a predictable regularity
both as to the types of plaintiffs and as to the nature of their alleged
negligence. In recognition of this fact, this Note has presented the due
diligence test in terms of the conduct which should be required from
members of the most frequently encountered classes of plaintiffs. The
general standards of conduct for investors have already taken shape;
those who fail to conform their conduct to these standards will almost
certainly forfeit the protection of rule IOb-5.
134. Id. at 705. See also Ply-Gem Indus., Inc. v. Green, [Current Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 94,705 (2d Cir. July 9, 1974) (plaintiff investor was given
sufficient disclosure of two unfavorable government contracts held by corporation);
Phillips v. Reynolds & Co., 294 F. Supp. 1249 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (plaintiff investors who
failed to carefully read Time magazine article given them by broker which stated "more
than $12 million has been poured into" corporation without a cent of profit cannot re-
cover against broker for material omission).
Cf. Thomas v. Duralite Co., 336 F. Supp. 698 (D.N.J. 1974). The plaintiff here
was a former insider and might be deemed an experienced investor. The plaintiff al-
leged he was not told of an impending lucrative merger, although he admitted the de-
fendant said that he himself was holding on to his own shares because "someone" might
want to buy the company. The court found for the plaintiff on the ground that "in
the context of the conversation," the defendant's reference to the fact that the company
might be worth "something" to "somebody" "conveyed the flavor of a garage sale, not
that of an important merger." Id. at 717.
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